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Abstract 
Fiscal federalism in Germany is characterized by lacking sub-national tax autonomy and 
intensive fiscal equalization. Due to a sunset clause, the current equalization system has to be 
renegotiated by the year 2019. Against this backdrop, this contribution studies the reform 
preferences of members of state parliaments. The study makes use of a self-conducted survey 
among the members of all 16 German state parliaments. It tests to which extent the 
preferences of these veto players for tax autonomy and fiscal equalization are driven by 
states’ self-interest, party ideology and individual characteristics. The results are helpful to 
understand the political-economic constraints of federal reforms. They indicate that besides 
the individual ideological position higher state wealth and lower debt levels are linked to 
larger reform support. Therefore, a promising new reform would have to address budgetary 
legacies like high pre-existing debt. 
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1 Introduction 
Germany’s fiscal federal system is characterized by both intense equalization across sub-
national jurisdictions and a large extent of vertical tax sharing (Rodden, 2003; Stegarescu, 
2005). Fiscal sovereignty with respect to tax autonomy is particularly low at the state level 
(“Länder”), which lack any significant degree of revenue autonomy. While recent 
constitutional reforms have increased state independence in several fields of legislation, all 
reform attempts towards larger state revenue autonomy or less intense fiscal equalization have 
failed and consensus for a constitutional reform in this regard has so far been out of reach. In 
this study we want to shed light on the nature and determinants of the reform resistance and 
thus the potential for future reforms. 
Since the seminal paper of Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986), the public finance literature has 
paid heavy attention to the normative side of tax autonomy and tax competition (Fuest et al., 
2005). Different generations of fiscal federalism research have identified how equalization 
systems can contribute to stabilization and efficiency (Oates, 1972, 2008) but also how 
equalization systems interact with tax competition and could possibly contribute to the 
internalization of tax competition externalities (Bucovetsky and Smart, 2006; Buettner, 2006). 
In contrast to this highly developed literature on the welfare enhancing design of federal 
institutions, the political-economic process driving these institutions’ evolution  has received 
much less attention. Information on the preferences and beliefs of actual political actors 
regarding reforms of the system of fiscal federalism are completely lacking. Hence, we do not 
know to which extent insights on optimal federal institutions from the theoretical literature 
have any imprint on real world decision making. This ignorance handicaps public finance 
scholars in their attempts to give advice to the political process. A better understanding for the 
preference formation of political veto players is a precondition for the design of politically 
feasible federal reform strategies.  
Germany is a particularly promising testing ground for a study of this type not only because 
the current fiscal equalization system features a low degree of revenue autonomy and intense 
equalization. In addition, the country’s current equalization system has a well-defined expiry 
date. A sunset clause stipulates that the laws which specify the institutional details and the 
precise extent of vertical and horizontal equalization in Germany expire by the end of 2019. 
Hence, new decisions on Germany’s system of fiscal federalism are unavoidable which may 
make it easier to overcome the status quo bias of the existing institutional arrangement. 
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We employ a unique database to study reform preferences with respect to both revenue 
autonomy and fiscal equalization. The core of our database is a self-conducted survey among 
members of all 16 German state parliaments which was in the field in 2011/12. We obtained 
answers from 639 politicians (out of 1861 state politicians) across all states and parties. 
German states have a decisive say in all reforms of fiscal federalism through the German 
upper house, the Bundesrat. An absolute majority of state votes in the Bundesrat is required to 
pass new laws with respect to ordinary rules of fiscal federalism. A change of the constitution 
for more fundamental reforms even requires the consent of two thirds of state votes. In the 
Bundesrat, states are represented through their respective state government, which in turn are 
elected from their respective state parliament. Hence, our study of members of state 
parliaments (MSP) relates to crucial veto players in any decisions on federal reforms. 
The survey answers are combined with both individual characteristics of the members of state 
parliaments and general state characteristics. Our empirical analysis serves two purposes: 
First, we want to widen the understanding on the determinants of reform preferences of sub-
national decision makers, such as state self-interest, party ideology or individual 
characteristics like education or parliamentary experience (see below section 5). Our findings 
can be related to predictions from existing theoretical work on tax competition and fiscal 
federalism. Second, we want to identify the degree of polarization among German states and 
their politicians with an eye towards the underlying majorities against or in favor of fiscal 
federalism reforms. In particular, we want to “predict” whether more revenue autonomy for 
states or less fiscal equalization would garner the necessary support in the Bundesrat, thus 
approximating future reform decisions as closely as possible (see below section 6). 
Our results indicate that ideology and specific state interests are jointly linked with federal 
reform preferences. Those politicians who prefer lower taxes and a smaller size of 
government are also more inclined to accept a more competitive type of federalism for 
Germany. State characteristics are of importance as well, although the effects are less subtle 
than predicted by the theory of tax competition: Politicians from poorer states and from states 
with significant debt and consolidation needs are more hesitant to accept tax autonomy or 
lower equalization intensity. A key result arises from our predicted majorities for the 
Bundesrat: A majority exists for lowering the degree of fiscal equalization, while a (fragile) 
blocking minority against more tax autonomy exists. Our insights on the drivers of preference 
heterogeneity points to a strategy which is promising to foster reform acceptance: a reform 
package which addresses budgetary legacies like high pre-existing debt. 
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The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 gives a brief summary on German fiscal 
federalism with a focus on sub-national states’ current degree of revenue autonomy. Section 3 
develops our hypotheses followed by descriptive (section 4) and econometric (section 5) 
evidence. Section 6 predicts voting behavior of all states in the Bundesrat and section 7 
concludes. 
 
 
2 German state autonomy and the reform debate 
 
The federal setting in Germany comprises three distinct layers with different but partly 
overlapping areas of responsibility: (1) the federal level (“Bund”) which is responsible inter 
alia for foreign and defense policy and social welfare programs, (2) the state level (“Länder”) 
which bears responsibility for education, police, but also road and railway construction among 
others, and (3) the municipal level (“Kommunen”) which is in charge of specific welfare 
programs (disabled, minimum income support for the elderly), local streets, theaters and other 
cultural facilities, preschools, fire departments, or waste management (Werner, 2006). 
Especially for the state level, however, tax competencies do not mirror the fiscal weights of 
the tasks assigned. Instead, the revenue situation is characterized both by a large degree of 
equalization across sub-national jurisdictions and by vertical tax sharing. 
Those taxes which have the largest yields are shared between the federal layers (see Table 1). 
These so called joint taxes comprise the income tax (including the wage tax), the final 
withholding tax on interest and capital gains, the corporation tax and the value added tax 
(VAT) (Federal Ministry of Finance, 2011). Among these, both the income tax and the VAT 
generate by far the most revenue. Taxes whose proceeds exclusively flow into state budgets 
are only of minor relevance, with the inheritance tax and the real estate transfer tax being the 
most important ones. Among those two, the states have limited tax rate autonomy only for the 
latter whereas the inheritance tax rates are fixed by federal law.1 Unlike in other federal 
countries like the US or Switzerland, German states have no competency to levy tax 
surcharges on top of tax rates determined by the federal level. This is the reason that Germany 
scores far below these federal countries in comparative indicators of revenue decentralization 
that take account of the sub-national autonomy in setting tax rates or defining tax bases 
(Stegarescu, 2005). 
                                                 
1 The German states are allowed to set real estate transfer tax rates within a bandwidth of 3.5 % to 5 %. 
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Table 1: Distribution of tax income on different types of taxes 
Type of tax Revenue (million Euro) Percent of overall tax revenue
Joint taxes 403,567 70.38
Federal taxes 99,134 17.29
State taxes 13,095 2.28
     Inheritance tax 4,246 0.74
     Real estate transfer tax 6,366 1.11
     Lottery tax 1,420 0.25
     Fire service tax 365 0.06
     Beer tax 702 0.12
Municipal taxes 52,984 9.24
Custom duties 4,571 0.79
Overall tax revenue 573,351
Data for 2011. 
Source: Federal Statistical Office (2012) 
 
Thus, the German federal system is based on the principles of cooperative federalism and 
lacks elements of competition (Braun, 2007). This is not only visible from the lacking tax 
autonomy at the state level but also from an intense fiscal equalization system (FES). The 
latter largely offsets the differences in the states’ revenue capacities and actual earnings. The 
system has its legal basis in Article 106 of the German constitution (“Grundgesetz”), which 
stipulates that living conditions in all geographic areas of Germany should be more or less 
equivalent (“Gleichwertigkeit der Lebensverhältnisse”) and revenues must be distributed 
between the different federal levels according to the needs of the layers to fulfill the specified 
tasks. There are four consecutive stages (Federal Ministry of Finance, 2012a). 
 (1) Vertical distribution of tax revenue 
First, joint taxes are distributed to the three different federal levels. With exception of VAT 
revenues, the federation’s and state’s shares of the remaining joint taxes are identical (see 
Table 2). 
 
Table 2: Assignment of joint taxes to different federal levels 
 Federation States Municipalities
Income tax 42.5 % 42.5 % 15 %
Withholding tax 44 % 44 % 12 %
Corporation tax 50 % 50 % -
Value added tax1 53 % 45 % 2 %
1 As compared to the shares of the remaining taxes which are established in the constitution, the shares of the 
VAT are regulated by simple law and change annually. The given figures are the last years’ average. 
Source: Federal Ministry of Finance (2011) 
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(2) Horizontal distribution of tax revenue 
Second, the sum of the aforementioned joint state taxes is distributed to the different states 
according to the principle of local revenue (i.e. each state earns the revenue which was 
collected through the state’s tax authorities). The income tax and the withholding tax are 
allotted according to the residence of the taxpayers, whereas the corporation tax is allotted 
according to the place of business. By contrast, the allotment of revenue from VAT is split 
into two parts: To close the gap between fiscally weak and fiscally rich states, as a first step, 
up to 25 % of the total states’ share is distributed to states where the average tax capacity 
without VAT revenue is below the all-state average.2 The remaining 75 % (at least) are then 
allocated according to the number of state residents. 
(3) Redistribution between poor and rich states 
The financial capacity per state and inhabitant (sum of all state receipts and 64 % of the 
municipalities’ receipts divided by the number of inhabitants) is decisive for the redistribution 
between the states. Since the financial needs in the three city states Berlin, Bremen and 
Hamburg are regarded to be higher as compared to the needs of the area states, the number of 
inhabitants in these three states is (fictitiously) increased by 35 %.3 A linear-progressive 
skimming-off schedule which partially closes the financing gap of those states where the 
(fictitious) financial capacity per state falls short of the average of all states financial capacity 
per inhabitant is used.4 This scheme ensures that the ranking of states after redistribution is 
the same as before redistribution (Federal Ministry of Finance, 2011). Recent data for the 
extent of redistribution are given in Table 3. 
(4) Supplementary federal grants 
Finally, there are general and special supplementary federal grants (SFG). General 
supplementary federal grants are given to those states whose financial capacity after 
redistribution falls short of 99.5 % of the states’ financial capacity’s average. This shortfall is 
then closed proportionally by 77.5 %, which ensures a considerable and substantial 
equalization of the states’ financial capacity (see Table 3). 
 
  
                                                 
2 The exact amount of apportionment depends on the difference of a state’s capacity to the overall average. A 
linear-progressive tax schedule is used (Federal Ministry of Finance, 2012a). 
3 The same, albeit to a lesser extent, holds true for three sparsely populated states of the former German 
Democratic Republic (GDR): Brandenburg, Mecklenburg-Western Pomerania and Saxony-Anhalt. 
4 Depending on the difference, up to 95 % of the gap is closed. 
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Table 3: Redistribution at different stages of FES 
 Financial capacity per inhabitant as a percentage of average 
financial capacity per inhabitant 
Stage of the FES Before state 
redistribution1 
After state 
redistribution 
With general  
SFG 
Hesse 116.0 105.7 105.7 
Bavaria 115.6 105.5 105.5 
Baden-Wuerttemberg 109.5 103.8 103.8 
Hamburg 102.1 101.1 101.1 
North Rhine-Westphalia 98.5 99.2 99.4 
Lower Saxony 97.6 98.8 99.3 
Schleswig-Holstein 97.4 98.7 99.3 
Rhineland-Palatinate 95.5 97.8 99.1 
Saarland 94.3 97.4 99.0 
Brandenburg 90.6 96.3 98.8 
Saxony 88.3 95.6 98.6 
Thuringia 88.0 95.5 98.6 
Saxony-Anhalt 88.0 95.5 98.6 
Mecklenburg-West Pomerania 86.5 95.1 98.5 
Bremen 74.1 91.9 97.8 
Berlin 68.1 90.5 97.5 
Data for 2010. 
Source: Federal Ministry of Finance (2011) 
1The figures already include VAT redistribution. 
 
Special SFG on top compensate specific states for additional burdens which can be traced 
back to German reunification or disproportionally high burdens due to administrative costs. 
The exact amounts of the grants are laid down by the Law on Financial Equalization 
(Finanzausgleichsgesetz). In 2010 the transfers to the Eastern German states and Berlin 
amounted to Euro 8.7 billion (Federal Ministry of Finance, 2012a).  
Taken together, the FES considerably harmonizes the financing capacities of the German 
states. Before any fiscal equalization takes place, the difference in financial capacity amounts 
to 47.9 percentage points (116 percent in Hesse compared to 68.1 percent in Berlin, all 
relative to the overall mean). Through all FES instruments this difference is reduced to only 
8.2 percentage points. A major share of the equalization takes place horizontally at the state 
level. In recent years, in particular four states (Bavaria, Hesse, Baden-Wuerttemberg, and, to a 
lesser extent, Hamburg) have financed the transfers to the remaining 12 states (see Figure 1).  
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Figure 1: Net-payer and net-receiver states of the FES stage 3 in 2011 
 
Source: Federal Ministry of Finance (2012b) 
 
The German constitution specifies the system’s general principles regarding tax assignments 
and the overall goal (“reasonable equalization of the disparate financial capacities of the 
Länder”). The more specific details are provided in ordinary laws, most important the “Fiscal 
Equalization Law” (“Finanzausgleichsgesetz”). This law expires by the end of 2019 so that 
new legislation is needed. Legislation is a joint responsibility of both German parliamentary 
chambers: the directly elected lower house (“Bundestag”) and the upper house (“Bundesrat”) 
which consists of the 16 federal states’ representatives. These are delegated by the respective 
state government. Representation in the Bundesrat follows degressive proportionality, i.e. 
smaller states have votes above population proportionality. States have to cast their Bundesrat 
votes as a single bloc. Federal laws with financial consequences for the states require a 
majority in both chambers of parliament. Changes of the constitution – including a possible 
new assignment of tax competencies – require a qualified majority of two thirds of the votes 
both in the Bundestag and the Bundesrat. 
There are several pros and cons which come along with such a fiscal equalization system. 
Referring to the benefits, traditional fiscal federalism arguments point to internalization of 
interjurisdictional spending or tax competition spillovers (Bucovetsky and Smart, 2006) and 
the reduction of the differences in public good provision capacities in regions with different 
tax capacities and income levels (Oates, 1999). In fact, exactly these arguments are mirrored 
in the German constitution as it is stipulated that living conditions in all geographic areas of 
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Germany should be more or less equivalent and revenues must be distributed between the 
different federal levels according to the needs of the layers to fulfill the specified tasks.  
Furthermore, the risk-sharing and redistribution elements of a FES serve as a buffer to region-
specific economic shocks and play an important role for income and consumption smoothing 
(Boadway, 2004). Referring to the German case, for instance Buettner (2002) shows that for 
the period 1970 to 1977 FES transfers have significantly contributed to smooth state-specific 
income shocks. These results are confirmed by Hepp and von Hagen (2012), who include the 
German post-unification period. However, the authors state that the current system “is much 
more effective in eliminating differences in state tax revenues and in shielding state budgets 
from the impact of asymmetric shocks” as compared to income insurance for private 
households, suggesting that politicians care more about “the implications for state 
governments than for private households in their regions” (Hepp and Von Hagen, 2012, p. 
252).  
The risk-sharing elements of the FES may at the same time entail disincentives impacting on 
budgetary decisions of the states. First, FES transfers generate a common pool problem, 
where spending decisions are unconnected to taxing decisions. In fact, spending decisions in 
one state are (co-)financed by taxpayers of the remaining jurisdictions (Rodden, 2003). As 
was shown by Velasco (1999), this results in excessive deficits and debt accumulation. The 
bail-outs of the states of Bremen and Saarland in the late 1980s are examples in the German 
context (Seitz, 1999). Second, the system induces disincentives for states to promote activities 
that increase a state’s revenue capacity or tax income, since above average revenues are 
implicitly taxed at high marginal rates (Stehn and Fedelino, 2009). Von Hagen and Hepp 
(2001) present evidence on this issue and show that the correlation of German state tax 
revenue and state GDP has declined over time. Third, disincentives also extend to the field of 
tax administration. For instance, more intense tax auditing at the firm level does only partially 
pay off in terms of additional state revenues. Therefore, state governments may face 
incentives to reduce costly auditing efforts at the cost of the remaining states (Baretti et al., 
2002; Krause-Junk, 2010). Finally, interjurisdictional transfers might not follow efficiency 
considerations but be actually driven by the political bargaining power of individual states. 
This could also be true for the German case, where besides the poor Eastern German states 
especially small Western German and city states are among the highest net receivers (which 
corresponds to these states' bargaining power as a consequence of degressive proportionality 
of votes in the Bundesrat (see Hepp and von Hagen, 2012, as well as Fink and Stratmann, 
2010). 
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Both the current extent of equalization and the lacking state tax autonomy are key topics of 
the ongoing reform debate. The level of disagreement among states has become clear by a 
constitutional complaint, which the states Bavaria and Hesse have filed against the current 
FES at the German Federal Constitutional Court in March 2013. And with respect to lacking 
tax autonomy, the German Council of Economic Experts and several other authors 
recommend to either separate tax competencies fully in order to end vertical tax sharing or to 
allow states and municipalities to levy tax surcharges/deductions on national taxes 
(Sachverständigenrat, 2003; Kitterer and Plachta, 2008; Fuest and Thöne, 2009; Feld, Kube 
and Schnellenbach, 2013).  
 
 
3 Determinants of beliefs: Predictions from economic theory 
Very different factors can influence an individual politician’s view with respect to state 
revenue autonomy. We distinguish between three dimensions: (1) State self-interest, (2) party 
ideology and government self-interest, as well as (3) individual characteristics related to 
information, education and parliamentary role/experience. 
 
(1) State self-interest 
The predictions related to self-interest are straightforward for fiscal equalization but less so 
for tax autonomy preference. Politicians from states which are recipients of (contributors to) 
the fiscal equalization system should tend to be in favor (against) more intense equalization. 
Of course, a pure insurance system against transitory shocks would not have a permanent 
distributional impact and all states might be interested to participate. As described above, the 
German system equates long-run revenue differences and, hence, produces a clear-cut pattern 
of beneficiaries and payers.  
With respect to tax autonomy the prediction is more complex. A normative argument against 
tax autonomy relates to the possible inefficiencies arising from tax competition. Horizontal 
tax competition may lead to welfare losses and a suboptimal low level of taxes (Zodrow and 
Mieszkowski, 1986), whereas vertical tax competition has the opposite effect, i.e. taxes are 
too high (Keen and Kotsogiannis, 2002). Insofar as these models’ assumptions would be valid 
for tax competition within Germany they are able to explain general resistance to tax 
autonomy but not yet the heterogeneity of views. For the latter it is important to note that 
11 
states may not be symmetric and to identify those states that benefit from tax competition in 
the eyes of a politician. In the political debate the argument has been influential that poor 
jurisdictions would lose from tax autonomy and might even be confronted with a vicious 
cycle of rising taxes and outward flows of mobile tax bases (high income individuals, 
companies). This argument is reinforced when agglomeration externalities play a role 
(Baldwin and Krugman, 2004). A different view is offered by Fuest (2008), who develops a 
model of tax competition with fiscal equalization and heterogeneity in state financial capacity. 
He distinguishes between two possible sources of a poor financial capacity: first, revenue 
shortage because of a low per capita income and, second, expenditure pressure because of 
special circumstances like a particularly high level of debt or pension obligations. The state 
government optimizes the welfare resulting from citizens consuming both private and public 
goods. With tax autonomy, a government is able to trade-off private good consumption 
against public good consumption through its tax decisions. The prediction from this model is 
that there should be two types of states with an interest in setting taxes different from the 
countrywide average. States with a low income and without any significant expenditure 
pressure should opt for particularly low taxes: Through lower taxes they can advance their 
citizens’ welfare by providing room for a higher level of consumption of private goods. By 
contrast, states with high income and expenditure pressure should prefer high taxes because 
this enables a welfare maximizing shift from private to public goods. High population 
mobility even strengthens the case that low income countries would opt for a low tax policy. 
One first insight from Fuest’s model is that we do not necessarily expect a high correlation 
with respect to our two survey questions in focus. Fiscal equalization and tax autonomy might 
be assessed by state representatives in a differentiated way. While strong equalization is 
clearly in the interest of poor states, there is a theoretical case to be made that very poor and 
very rich states could welcome tax autonomy whereas “average” states can well live with a 
uniform countrywide level of taxation.5 
In addition, we also expect that large states are relatively more opposed to an increase in 
states’ tax autonomy compared to small states. Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991) present a 
model with jurisdictions of different size but with the same capital-to-labor ratio. Labor is 
immobile whereas capital is the mobile production factor. In the non-cooperative equilibrium 
                                                 
5 There is the subtle problem that uniform national tax rates in the status quo may not be equal to the average tax 
rates in the competitive equilibrium with state tax autonomy. Our subsequent analysis goes through if member of 
state parliaments take today’s uniform tax rate as a proxy for the expected average tax rate in a possible future 
competitive situation. We are not aware of any study that has quantitatively determined the average tax rate in a 
competitive equilibrium, and hence the existing tax rate may serve as an anchor for politicians.  
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of this setup larger states are worse off compared to small states because small states have an 
incentive to set lower tax rates, which attracts capital and, eventually, leads to rising wages. 
When small and large states have the same utility in the absence of tax competition, more 
opposition should come from larger states. In our set-up, of course, the underlying 
assumptions like labor immobility are not fulfilled. However, we still expect small states (in 
terms of population) to be more in favor of tax autonomy than large states. 
We can summarize our expectations as follows: 
Members of state parliaments (MSPs) from states which are net contributors to the fiscal 
equalization system should be more opposed to extensive equalization compared to MSPs 
from net receiving states. 
For income, we expect a non-linear impact: States with incomes (far) above and below the 
mean income should favor tax autonomy whereas states with an average position should have 
less interest in tax autonomy. 
MSPs from small states (in terms of population) are relatively more supportive of tax 
autonomy than representatives from large states. 
Special state handicaps in tax competition should matter: States with high debt and/or 
permanently high deficits should be more opposed to tax competition compared to low debt 
states. 
 
(2) Party program and government participation 
 
Party programs differ with respect to the weights they assign to concepts like “solidarity”, 
“incentives” or “individual responsibility”. Furthermore, ideology impacts on the perception 
of economic constraints. For example, Heinemann and Janeba (2011) show how ideology 
influences the perception of firm mobility in the context of tax policy decisions. Similar to 
welfare state reforms or tax policy, decisions on the parameters of a federal constitution imply 
decisions on trade-offs between distributive preferences and efficiency. We would expect that 
parties from the left will assign a larger weight to the notion of inter-state solidarity relative to 
individual state responsibility. In contrast, market-liberal parties should rather stress the 
importance of state competition and incentives with a critical view on intense equalization and 
lacking tax autonomy. 
Independent of party affiliation it could make a difference whether a MSP belongs to the 
government’s coalition parties or not. From the perspective of an opposition MSP, receipts 
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from a generous equalization system may be less appealing since the political advantage of 
this resource inflow goes to the incumbent government. Vice versa, opposition MSPs in rich 
states might be more favorable to the burden of payments into the equalization system since it 
constrains the incumbent government. Of course, these considerations are subject to 
expectations of a possible future power shift between parliamentary parties. 
Our expectation is as follows: 
MSPs from the political left should be more supportive of equalization payments and more 
opposed to tax autonomy compared to other parties and market-liberal parties, in particular. 
Compared to government MSPs, opposition MSPs in poor states (rich states) should be more 
opposed to (supportive of) intense equalization.  
 
(3) Individual characteristics 
Besides state interests and ideological imprint, individual education, information and 
parliamentary experience could matter. There is a growing literature which looks at the 
impact of these individual characteristics of policy makers. Referring to education, for 
instance, Besley et al. (2011) show that the education of political leaders matters for growth. 
Using random leadership transitions based on unexpected deaths, the authors find that the 
better (worse) educated a departing leader is, the lower (higher) the growth of GDP after the 
leader transition. Furthermore, the subject of an academic education appears to matter for 
economic preferences. US congress members trained in economics are less likely to support 
minimum wage increases (O'Roark and Wood, 2011) and members of the European 
Parliament with an economics education  are more opposed to the introduction of an EU tax 
than their parliamentary colleagues (Heinemann et al., 2009). 
Information and former professional positions seem to play a role, too: Göhlmann and Vaubel 
(2007) reveal that inflation preferences of central bankers are driven by their former 
occupation (the results are confirmed by Farvaque et al., 2011). Evidence in a similar vein is 
presented by Dreher et al. (2009) who show that a leader’s professional background, e.g. 
being a former entrepreneur, is a statistically significant determinant in explaining a country’s 
reform performance. With respect to subnational German finance ministers, Jochimsen and 
Thomasius (2012) present evidence suggesting that the financial expertise of a finance 
minister matters. Finance ministers who have worked in the financial business sector before 
their appointment achieve lower deficits than their counterparts without such experiences. 
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Finally, there are studies looking at a politician’s experience in office. Referring to European 
national finance ministers, Moessinger (2012) finds that the increase in the debt to GDP ratio 
is smaller, the longer the tenure of the finance minister. The finding is robust to the inclusion 
of the time in office of the prime minister and another measure on political stability. The 
results are thus in line with a cross-section analysis for Switzerland, which also reveals that 
the finance minister’s experience in office affects fiscal policy (Feld and Schaltegger, 2010). 
In the empirical analysis, we are able to control for individual characteristics, such as age, 
gender, educational attainments, membership in the budget or legal committee, and the 
number of years in parliament. Thus, the characteristics included refer both to education and 
the level of information (proxied by membership in specialized committees or length of 
parliamentary membership). 
We do not have a sign prediction for these individual characteristics. Equally well informed 
positions on an “optimum” federal system can be highly diverse as the academic literature on 
fiscal federalism and tax competition indicates.  
 
 
4 Survey details 
We conducted our survey among the members of all 16 German state parliaments which was 
conducted in three rounds. Parliaments of Bavaria, Brandenburg, Lower Saxony, Saarland, 
Schleswig-Holstein and Thuringia were surveyed in March and April 2011. The second round 
was conducted in Saxony, Saxony-Anhalt, North Rhine-Westphalia, Hesse and Hamburg in 
December 2011 and January 2012. The final, third round in April and May 2012 completed 
the survey by questioning the MSPs of Baden-Württemberg, Rhineland Palatinate, Bremen, 
Berlin and Mecklenburg-West Pomerania. The reason for this sequential implementation was 
the different timing of the elections in the states. Specifically, surveys were conducted 
approximately at mid-term of an electoral cycle, such that members of parliament did not face 
electoral campaigns or post-election government formation procedures.  
The first step in each survey was a contact with the respective parliament’s presidential office. 
We informed the presidency on the survey’s academic intentions and asked to recommend 
participation to the MSPs. Subsequently, the MSPs were approached individually by written 
letters. Letters were addressed to the MSPs’ offices in their election district and not to the 
parliament’s address. This decentralized addressing was chosen to lower the risk of any 
coordinated answering, that is, through staff in the parliamentary factions. During the first 
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round non-answering MSPs received a follow-up email with the questionnaire attached. If 
they did not answer, we contacted them by phone calls. In the second and third rounds the 
email to non-answering politicians additionally included a link to an online platform which 
allowed them to answer the questionnaire online. 639 MSPs finally participated in the survey 
which resulted in a response rate of 34 percent. Response rates differ along the dimensions 
state and party affiliation (see Table 4 for response rates across states) but also along 
individual characteristics of state politicians (see non-response analysis in section 5).  
 
Table 4: Survey participation by state 
  No. of MSP Responses Response rate
Baden-Wuerttemberg 138 77 55.80 %
Bavaria 187 75 40.11 %
Berlin 149 30 20.13 %
Brandenburg 88 19 21.59 %
Bremen 83 18 21.69 %
Hamburg 124 39 31.45 %
Hesse 114 50 43.86 %
Mecklenburg-West Pomerania 71 17 23.94 %
Lower Saxony 152 54 35.53 %
North Rhine-Westphalia 181 51 28.18 %
Rhineland-Palatinate 101 50 49.50 %
Saarland 51 20 39.22 %
Saxony 133 45 33.83 %
Saxony-Anhalt 106 47 44.79 %
Schleswig-Holstein 95 29 30.53 %
Thuringia 88 36 40.91 %
Total 1861 639 34.34 %
 
Table 5: Survey participation by party 
  No. of MSP Responses Response rate
Christian Democrats 681 284 41.70%
Free Democrats 123 41 33.33%
Green Party 239 75 31.38%
Left Party 200 47 23.50%
Social Democrats 559 173 30.95%
Other 59 19 32.20%
Total 1861 639 34.34%
 
Politicians were guaranteed confidentiality on the individual response but were informed that 
aggregate results would be published. Data were collected non-anonymously so that it is 
possible to match them with individual characteristics of MSPs, which are publicly available 
on the MSPs’ official websites. The survey consists of questions related to the new German 
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constitutional debt brake, expenditure preferences and preferences on fiscal equalization and 
tax autonomy. The latter two are the focus of this analysis and are formulated as follows: 
 
Tax autonomy question:6 “It is repeatedly discussed to grant German states more tax 
autonomy. One of the options debated is, for example, the right to levy surcharges on income 
or corporate taxes. Would you be in favour of states being allowed to levy these surcharges 
and determining their level autonomously?” 
Answers are given on a discrete 9 point scale from -4 (“no”) to +4 (“yes”) with 0 indicated as 
“undecided”. 
 
Fiscal equalization question:7 “The current construction of the state fiscal equalization system 
is also subject to an ongoing debate. How do you assess the current extent of redistribution 
among the states (including all instruments of the federal equalization system)? The current 
equalization in the financial capacity across states through the fiscal equalization is …”  
Answers are given on a discrete 9 point scale from -4 (“too low”) to +4 (“too far reaching”) 
with 0 indicated as “appropriate”.  
 
The descriptive results point to highly diverse tax autonomy preferences. Figure 2 shows that 
there is – with a thin margin – an absolute majority of respondents who tend to support higher 
state tax autonomy compared to the status quo (51 percent) whereas 10 percent have a neutral 
position and 39 percent are opposed. The mode falls on the strongest rejection of tax 
autonomy. Thus, opponents have a more determined view compared to the supporters of tax 
autonomy. 
 
                                                 
6 The questions (like the whole questionnaire) are in German. The original German formulation is as follows: 
“Immer wieder wird diskutiert, ob deutsche Bundesländer eine höhere Besteuerungsautonomie erhalten sollen. 
Im Gespräch ist dabei beispielsweise ein Zuschlagsrecht auf die Einkommen- und Körperschaftsteuer. Würden 
Sie es begrüßen, wenn die Bundesländer solche Zuschläge erheben und die Höhe dieser Zuschläge eigenständig 
festlegen dürften?“ 
7 The original German formulation is as follows: „Ebenso wird die derzeitige Ausgestaltung des 
Länderfinanzausgleichs immer wieder diskutiert. Wie beurteilen Sie das derzeitige Ausmaß der Umverteilung 
zwischen den Bundesländern (unter Einschluss aller Instrumente des bundesstaatlichen Finanzausgleichs)? Die 
derzeitige Angleichung in der Finanzausstattung zwischen den Bundesländern über den Finanzausgleich ist… zu 
gering/angemessen/zu weitgehend.“ 
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Figure 2: Tax autonomy preferences – overall result 
 
 
Figure 3: Tax autonomy preferences – by state 
 
 
On first sight, answering patterns differ mainly across states and ideology. Using an analysis 
of variance (ANOVA), the null hypothesis that mean answers across states are equal can be 
rejected at all conventional significance levels (see also Figure 3). MSPs from net-paying 
states (within the fiscal equalization scheme) are more in favour of tax autonomy (mean 
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answer is 0.95) than those from net-recipient states (mean answer is -0.41), where this 
difference is significant at the one percent level (see Table 6). The pattern across parties is 
visually not as clear cut, but the null hypothesis that mean answers do not differ across parties 
can also be rejected at the one percent level. Mean answers also differ significantly at the five 
percent level, if ideology is measured by categorizing parties as right and left parties.8 On 
average, politicians affiliated to right parties are more in favour of tax autonomy (mean 
answer is 0.35) than politicians from left parties (mean answer is -0.17).  
 
Table 6: Tax autonomy question by status in inter-state fiscal equalization scheme and 
by ideology 
 Total Net-paying 
states 
Net-recipient 
states 
Total Member of 
right parties 
Member of 
left parties 
Observations 637 240 397 572 325 247 
Mean 0.107 0.954 -0.406 0.122 0.348 -0.174 
Standard-Deviation 3.043 2.827 3.058 3.039 3.039 2.946 
P-Value of F-Test  0.000  0.042 
Notes: The Null hypothesis is that groups have equal means. The minimum value (maximum value) for each 
group is -4 (4). 
 
Preferences on fiscal equalization show systematic differences compared to those for tax 
autonomy. Figure 4 reveals that the mode is the neutral position with a share of 30 percent, 
implying that most MSPs think the equalization scheme is just right as it is. The share of 
MSPs who reveal preferences for a lower extent of equalization (47 percent), however, clearly 
exceeds the share of those who are in favor for an even higher transfer level (23 percent). 
By and large, Figure 5 displays that this pattern also holds for many states individually, but 
not for all. A majority of MSPs in Bremen (one of the most prominent net-recipient states in 
per capita terms) thinks the redistribution of the current fiscal equalization scheme to be too 
small, while a majority in the three main net-paying states assess it to be too far-reaching, 
which is quite intuitive. 
                                                 
8 Left Party, Green Party and Social Democrats classified as “left”. Christian Democrats and Free Democrats are 
classified as “right”. Parties like the Bavarian Free Voters are unclassified. Therefore, the number of total 
observations drops to 572. 
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Figure 4: Fiscal equalization preferences – overall results 
 
Figure 5: Fiscal equalization preferences – by state 
 
 
When partitioning states according to their status within the inter-state fiscal equalization 
scheme (Table 7), net-recipients on average favor the current intensity of equalization (mean 
answer is -0.08), whereas MSPs from net-paying states clearly advocate a less ambitious 
redistribution (mean answer is 2.16). This difference in means is again significant at the one 
percent level. Differences also exist along party lines. As Table 7 shows, none of the political 
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camps think fiscal equalization should be intensified. However, politicians from right parties 
(mean answer is 1.06) are rather in favor of cutbacks compared to MSPs from the left (mean 
answer is 0.28). 
 
Table 7: Fiscal equalization question by status in inter-state fiscal equalization scheme 
and by ideology 
 Total Net-paying 
states 
Net-recipient 
states 
Total Member of 
right parties 
Member of 
left parties 
Observations 631 239 392 566 324 242 
Mean 0.765 2.159 -0.084 0.723 1.056 0.277 
Standard-Deviation 2.136 1.896 1.802 2.149 2.105 2.131 
P-Value of F-Test  0.000  0.000 
Notes: The Null hypothesis is that groups have equal means. The minimum value (maximum value) for each 
group -4 (4). 
5 Econometric analyses 
5. 1 Missing value problem and non-response analysis 
First we pay attention to the different response rates of politicians and their possible 
consequences for statistical inference. The underlying missing data mechanism could bias the 
characteristics of the available data sample and impair the reliability of subsequent testing 
(Allison, 2002). The descriptive analysis above indicates that the propensity to respond is 
correlated with individual characteristics like ideology. Furthermore, experimental studies 
show that a particular individual interest into the survey topic drives survey participation 
(Groves et al., 2004). We would expect similar patterns for our survey with experts on state 
budgetary issues to be keener to voice their views. 
Non-response may cause a biased sample under certain conditions (Rubin, 1976; Allison, 
2002). Missing data would not cause any problems if we could assume them to be “missing 
completely at random (MCAR)”. This is the case if the probability of missing is unrelated to 
any other variables in the sample. The missing generating process would be an unbiased 
lottery not distorting the information value of the sample. This assumption is hardly fulfilled 
in our case given the link between response probability and individual characteristics. A 
further possibility is that data are “missing at random (MAR)”: This is the case if the 
probability of missing variables for a variable Y is unrelated to the values of variable Y after 
controlling for other covariates. In our context this is fulfilled if other observable variables 
(like the MSPs’ individual characteristics) are crucial to explain participation in the survey. In 
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this case, a satisfactory strategy is to include those variables which play a role in participation 
into the subsequent regression model. The regression then adjusts for all observable 
differences between missing and non-missing cases. A more problematic situation exists if 
even the MAR assumptions are violated and the probability of a Y observation depends also 
on the value of Y (besides depending on other covariates). In this case the missing data 
mechanism is “non-ignorable”.  
It seems plausible that in our case the assumptions of the less problematic MAR case are 
fulfilled. First, we do not have a significant item non-response problem but predominantly 
face unit non-response.9 The latter can cause serious problems in the measurement of actors’ 
positions if they want to hide some views for strategic reasons (König et al., 2005). 
Fortunately, item non-response is negligible in our case (0.3 percent for the tax autonomy and 
0.9 percent for the fiscal equalization question), presumably because our questions are not 
very sensitive. This is an indication towards the validity of the MAR assumption. Second, the 
promised confidentiality of individual answers makes it less likely that it is a particular 
preference which could drive participation. Third, we have information on the set of all state 
politicians in Germany, whether they participated in our survey or not. This allows us to 
model the missing data mechanism. For example, we can control for the familiar effect that 
expertise drives participation through membership in committees and professional education. 
Thus, in our analysis we are able to neutralize the impact of key participation determinants. 
The rich availability of covariates further increases the plausibility of the MAR assumption. 
Thus, we are confident to classify our sample selection-problem to be of the MAR type. The 
missing data mechanism is unlikely to distort our results as long as we include those variables 
among the covariates which drive participation.  
We deal with the missing variable problem in two ways: First, we start with a unit non-
response analysis to identify variables at the individual and state level that might have 
affected politicians’ decisions to answer the questionnaire or not. Those variables identified 
need to be included in the subsequent regressions. This will greatly reduce any potential 
estimation bias. Second, we provide robustness checks based on weighted regressions. This is 
one of the possible further precautions to reduce bias from unit non-response (Little and 
Vartivarian, 2005). 
                                                 
9 Unit non-response occurs if a MSP does not answer the questionnaire at all whereas item non-response refers to 
cases where survey respondents do not answer all questions. In household surveys, item non-response is typical 
for particularly sensitive questions related, for example, to the level of income and wealth. 
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To study non-response we run a probit regression with a dummy for a response (=1, 0 
otherwise) as our dependent variable (see Table 8). We control for individual characteristics 
such as educational background, information on political functions within the state 
parliaments, age, gender, and individual party affiliation. Further, we control for state 
characteristics by including state dummy variables. Standard errors of all regressions 
presented here are clustered at the party-state level.10 We include different sets of variables 
(individual information, party affiliation, state dummies) separately and jointly to be sure that 
results are robust. 
Regarding individual characteristics, we find that politicians who studied economics or 
business and/or are a member of the respective state parliament’s budget committee exhibit a 
significantly higher inclination to having answered our questionnaire. This is in line with the 
insight on the role of topic interest for participation (Groves et al., 2004). Furthermore, 
members of governing coalition parties are significantly less inclined to respond perhaps 
because some of them have a time-consuming role in the government. Female politicians also 
took part in our survey with lower probability than their male colleagues and there are some 
significant differences across parties. These significant variables should be incorporated as 
controls into our subsequent analyses in order to safeguard the MAR-assumptions on sample 
selection. 
  
                                                 
10 Politicians are nested within states and parties. One and the same party, however, often differs across states, 
which is why we chose to cluster politicians at the party-state level, instead of the state or party level only. 
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Table 8: Probit estimation for unit non-responses with response (=1, 0 otherwise) as 
dependent variable 
 
  
 (1)  (2) (3) (4)  
Education     
College entrance qualification -0.162  -0.158 -0.138 
 [-1.153]  [-1.131] [-0.975] 
Tertiary degree 0.140  0.151 0.150 
 [1.074]  [1.105] [1.140] 
Economics/Business degree 0.200**  0.182* 0.170* 
 [2.236]  [1.831] [1.834] 
Law degree 0.117  0.089 0.068 
 [1.270]  [0.963] [0.744] 
Information     
Member of budget committee 0.353***  0.333*** 0.360*** 
 [4.623]  [4.384] [4.680] 
Member of legal committee 0.032  0.029 0.046 
 [0.353]  [0.335] [0.500] 
Number of years in parliament 0.000  -0.002 -0.004 
 [0.002]  [-0.341] [-0.697] 
Power     
Member of state gov’t coalition -0.106  -0.204** -0.169** 
 [-1.502]  [-2.185] [-2.328] 
Other individual characteristics     
Female -0.308***  -0.280*** -0.274*** 
 [-4.583]  [-4.256] [-4.122] 
Age in years 0.003  0.005 0.003 
 [0.807]  [1.321] [0.822] 
Party affiliationa     
Christian Democrats  0.242** 0.250* 0.283** 
  [2.347] [1.705] [2.496] 
Social Democrats  0.004 0.026 0.102 
  [0.036] [0.152] [0.810] 
Green Party  -0.033 0.043 0.065 
  [-0.254] [0.232] [0.506] 
Left Party  -0.148 -0.259 -0.118 
  [-1.044] [-1.404] [-0.739] 
Other parties  0.121 -0.094 0.059 
  [0.485] [-0.291] [0.240] 
Regression diagnostics     
State fixed effects    
Observations 1,861 1,861 1,861 1,861 
Pseudo R2 0.059 0.043 0.038 0.065 
Notes: This table displays regression coefficients; */**/*** denote significance at the 10%/5%/1% level; standard errors in 
brackets are clustered at the state level; a base category is the liberal democratic party. 
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5.2 Identification and true revelation of preferences 
A problem distinct from selection bias is that our cross-section survey does not allow 
applying quasi-experimental designs like diff-in-diff estimations which could establish causal 
links more convincingly. The correlation we observe between MSP characteristics and federal 
preferences can thus be influenced by reversed causation. For example, strategic delegation 
could play a role since voters and/or party organizations may strategically delegate agents 
with particular preferences into representative parliaments in order to impact on the outcome 
of parliamentary negotiations. Equally, the selection of policy makers can be influenced by 
the jurisdiction’s state of economy (Hallerberg and Wehner, 2013). Thus, while our 
regressions are informative on the observable correlations between MSPs’ federalisms 
preferences and state or individual characteristics, we cannot be certain about the nature of the 
underlying causal link. However, we view this restriction to be a side issue since our main 
interest is to study the heterogeneity of MSPs’ preferences across states and not how 
individual preferences are actually formed.11  
A further problem relates to the possibility of untruthful answers by politicians. Our survey is 
non-incentivized with the consequence that the usual “cheap talk”-skepticism may also hold 
for our results. While this criticism is valid in principle, our survey is superior to recording 
votes (for an example in the context of voting in the European Parliament: Hix and Noury, 
2009; Hix et al., 2009) which is an alternative standard approach for measuring politicians’ 
preferences. Observable voting behavior is subject to sanctions from parties and, hence, an 
even less reliable source of information for individual preferences. Incentivizing politicians in 
a laboratory experiment is hardly an attractive option either: If the revelation of true 
preferences is politically costly for a politician it is probably not possible to neutralize this 
bias through standard experimental incentives. In concluding this section, we cannot exclude 
the existence of untruthful answers. Yet our survey approach with a confidential treatment of 
individual responses offers probably the best available option to study MSPs’ preferences. 
 
5.3 Results for tax autonomy and fiscal equalization preferences 
In our econometric testing we measure the extent of significant and robust links consistent 
with our hypotheses developed above. With respect to the individual characteristics, we 
include information on educational achievements (tertiary degree dummy, specialization in 
                                                 
11 The identification problem is a larger problem for the literature mentioned in section 3 which explicitly wants 
to measure the causal impact of politicians’ individual characteristics on policy performance 
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economics/business dummy), the amount of information (committee membership dummies 
and length of parliamentary experience), the power dimension (dummy for membership in a 
government party), as well as gender and age (see Tables A1 and A2 in the appendix for data 
sources and descriptive statistics). 
We employ different variants to measure ideology. First, we use simple party dummies, both 
separate for each party and a rougher bipolar distinction between “left” and “right” parties. 
Second, we take account of cross-state variation in party positions within the same party 
through an indicator of policy field salience developed by Pappi and Seher (2013).12 The 
indicator is based on textual analyses of the party election programs (at the state level) and the 
weight of a particular policy field in the program. For our purpose, we make use of the 
particular indicator for the field of economic policy (comprising economy, traffic, agriculture 
and public finances). A strong weight on economic policy in the party program (and, hence, a 
lower emphasis on social or other policy fields) is indicative for a stronger party orientation 
towards economic constraints. The indicator’s cross-state variation is important when a party 
addresses voters in different states with a state-specific program.13 Third, we include an 
individual ideology measure originating from the survey itself. In the survey we asked how 
the politician would spend a surplus of 100 Euros in the state budget with the available 
options of cutting taxes, redeeming debt or increasing expenditures. We take the percentage 
allocated to the cut of taxes as our individual ideological proxy with a large (small) amount 
indicating a “right” (“left”) government ideology. 
Our selection of state characteristics is driven by our theoretical considerations above. We 
include proxies for the states’ current economic position (GDP per capita) and size 
(population). In line with our reasoning on the relative merits of tax autonomy for those states 
above or below the mean we also include the deviation of a state’s GDP from the mean. We 
also include and experiment with other important fiscally related variables, such as the debt to 
GDP ratio, the 3-year-average of the deficit ratio and the consolidation need. The latter has 
been calculated by the German Council of Economic Experts (Sachverständigenrat, 2011) and 
measures the fiscal adjustment necessary to comply with the constitutional debt brake, which 
requires a zero structural deficit of German states from the year 2020 onwards. Furthermore, 
we include the current level of fiscal equalization transfers to capture the advantage or 
disadvantage from the equalization system. All state characteristics are included in the 
                                                 
12 We thank Franz Pappi for providing us with this state-specific indicator. 
13 For example voters in Eastern German states have different policy preferences as a consequence from 
socialization under Communism (Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln, 2007). 
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regression on a real time principle, that is, we use 2010 data for the survey waves which took 
place in 2011 and 2011 data for the 2012 waves. 
The results of our regression analysis are shown in Table 9 (tax autonomy preference) and 
Table 10 (fiscal equalization preference). In both tables, columns (1) to (4) include the results 
for different specifications of the ideological proxies. Columns (5) and (6) inform about the 
impact of varying legacy proxies and columns (7) and (8) add interaction effects which 
account for the possible asymmetry between MSPs from government and opposition parties. 
With exception of the two latter specifications which are estimated using OLS due to the 
interactions included, all remaining specifications display marginal effects for the maximum 
response category (= +4) based on ordered probit estimations. 
For both dimensions of federal preferences, individual characteristics do not play an important 
role with one exception: Members of the legal committees are less inclined to accept an 
increase in tax state autonomy. Preference formation may thus be influenced by the awareness 
of the current legal constraints in the Federal Republic of Germany, which set high hurdles for 
more state tax autonomy and require a change of the constitution. Interestingly, however, 
there is no equivalent, statistically significant impact of being a member of the budget 
committee. 
Party ideology matters: Politicians from the Social Democrats or the Green Party are much 
less likely to accept lower equalization intensity than those from the liberal Free Democrats, 
For tax autonomy, a (weakly) significant difference only exists between the Green Party and 
the Free Democrats. Both the simple right party dummy and the more refined state party 
specific indicator have the expected sign but miss significance. Our individual ideology proxy 
is significant in both cases: Preferences for lower taxes are linked to a larger support for tax 
autonomy and a less ambitious equalization. 
As for state characteristics, there is a highly significant link between the income level and 
fiscal variables on the one hand and federal preferences on the other hand. However, the 
detailed findings do not fully correspond to our theoretical expectations. In line with our 
hypothesis, politicians from states with significant fiscal burdens and need for fiscal 
adjustment are less ready to accept tax autonomy. This effect is significant no matter how we 
measure legacies (debt, average past deficit or consolidation needs). The effect of population 
size is as expected, too. Ceteris paribus, larger states are more opposed to tax autonomy. The 
result, however, is not statistically significant with exception of specification 5. Furthermore, 
the result for the impact of the absolute deviation of state GDP from the mean contradicts our 
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expectation. Politicians from states with a GDP below or above the country average obviously 
do not welcome tax autonomy since they show a significantly lower readiness to open the way 
for autonomous state tax policies. The same variable is largely insignificant for equalization 
preferences. Our expectation that the beneficiaries of fiscal equalization like high transfers 
clearly shows up in the data albeit this effect is hidden behind a multicollinearity 
phenomenon: Fiscal equalization receipts are not robustly significant but this indicator is 
highly correlated with state GDP and legacy indicators (we come back to this issue in the 
robustness section below). 
Results for interaction terms are presented in column 7 and column 8. Here, we look at the 
combined effect of being a member of a state government and the amount of fiscal 
equalization transfers to GDP (and GDP per capita, respectively). As the estimation of 
interaction effects is not reliable in a non-linear estimation model, we rely on an OLS 
regression for this specification. One significant asymmetry between government and 
opposition politicians is detected: In states with high transfer receipts, members of 
government parties are less inclined to accept tax autonomy than from opposition parties. This 
effect is not found for equalization preferences. 
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Table 9: Regression results for tax autonomy question (-4=not in favour; +4=in favour)  
  
 Ideological variations Legacy variation Interaction effects 
 (1) OProbit (2) OProbit (3) OProbit (4) OProbit (5) OProbit (6) OProbit (7) OLS (8) OLS 
Education         
Tertiary degree -0.0348 -0.0360 -0.0349 -0.0355 -0.0402 -0.0329 -0.3230 -0.3347 
 [0.0252] [0.0255] [0.0252] [0.0255] [0.0256] [0.0251] [0.2982] [0.3012] 
Economics/Business degree 0.0223 0.0342 0.0339 0.0236 0.0219 0.0199 0.2964 0.3079 
 [0.0288] [0.0286] [0.0290] [0.0291] [0.0293] [0.0292] [0.3156] [0.3168] 
Information         
Member of budget committee -0.0205 -0.0200 -0.0195 -0.0207 -0.0191 -0.0209 -0.3105 -0.3049 
 [0.0257] [0.0259] [0.0257] [0.0262] [0.0262] [0.0263] [0.2733] [0.2715] 
Member of legal committee -0.0569* -0.0555* -0.0560* -0.0569* -0.0562* -0.0576* -0.7309** -0.7243** 
 [0.0323] [0.0330] [0.0329] [0.0327] [0.0316] [0.0327] [0.3431] [0.3405] 
Number of years in parliament 0.0020 0.0018 0.0018 0.0016 0.0022 0.0018 0.0145 0.0162 
 [0.0015] [0.0015] [0.0015] [0.0015] [0.0016] [0.0015] [0.0169] [0.0170] 
Power         
Member of state gov’t coalition 0.0118 0.0015 -0.0020 -0.0001 -0.0029 -0.0001 0.1748 -0.8976 
 [0.0230] [0.0213] [0.0226] [0.0218] [0.0196] [0.0212] [0.2513] [0.9889] 
Other individual characteristics         
Female -0.0386 -0.0290 -0.0302 -0.0431* -0.0388 -0.0416* -0.5567* -0.5419* 
 [0.0258] [0.0252] [0.0249] [0.0247] [0.0245] [0.0244] [0.2877] [0.2901] 
Age in years -0.0015 -0.0016 -0.0016 -0.0015 -0.0016 -0.0016 -0.0156 -0.0168 
 [0.0011] [0.0011] [0.0011] [0.0011] [0.0011] [0.0011] [0.0123] [0.0123] 
Ideology         
Christian Democrats -0.0595        
 [0.0534]        
Social Democrats -0.0786        
 [0.0558]        
Green Party -0.0995*        
 [0.0575]        
Left Party 0.0180        
 [0.0651]        
Other parties -0.0223        
 [0.0679]        
Right parties  0.0189       
  [0.0202]       
Pappi Indicator   0.0106      
   [0.0125]      
Preference for lower taxes and fees    0.0028** 0.0026** 0.0029** 0.0282*** 0.0272** 
    [0.0011] [0.0012] [0.0011] [0.0106] [0.0108] 
Continued on next page.         
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Table 9: Regression results for tax autonomy question (-4=not in favour; +4=in favour) (continued) 
 
  
 Ideological variations Legacy variation Interaction effects 
 (1) OProbit (2) OProbit (3) OProbit (4) OProbit (5) OProbit (6) OProbit (7) OLS (8) OLS 
State characteristicsa: income and size         
GDP per capita 0.0115*** 0.0097*** 0.0099*** 0.0097*** 0.0124*** 0.0082*** 0.0944*** 0.0767*** 
 [0.0024] [0.0023] [0.0023] [0.0022] [0.0018] [0.0018] [0.0210] [0.0259] 
Absolute deviation of state GDP per  -0.0122** -0.0100** -0.0102** -0.0098** -0.0172*** -0.0111** -0.1217** -0.1171** 
    capita from federal GDP per capita [0.0050] [0.0049] [0.0050] [0.0048] [0.0038] [0.0046] [0.0512] [0.0516] 
Population -0.0021 -0.0018 -0.0016 -0.0020 -0.0083** -0.0039 -0.0463 -0.0468 
 [0.0043] [0.0044] [0.0045] [0.0043] [0.0035] [0.0042] [0.0459] [0.0458] 
State characteristicsa: legacies         
Total debt to GDP -0.0022* -0.0020* -0.0022* -0.0021*     
 [0.0012] [0.0012] [0.0012] [0.0011]     
3 year average of deficit to GDP     -0.0576***    
     [0.0135]    
Consolidation needs as share of GDP      -0.0384*** -0.4035** -0.4007** 
      [0.0149] [0.1632] [0.1655] 
State characteristicsa: equalization         
Fiscal equalization transfers to GDP 0.0211 0.0126 0.0135 0.0143 -0.0074 0.0141 0.3419 0.1002 
 [0.0202] [0.0200] [0.0202] [0.0197] [0.0117] [0.0161] [0.2331] [0.1832] 
Interaction effects         
Fiscal equalization transfers to GDP ×       -0.3930*  
     Member of state gov’t coalition       [0.2054]  
GDP per capita ×        0.0316 
     Member of state gov’t coalition        [0.0297] 
Constant         
Constant term (OLS estimation)       -0.3342 0.2971 
       [0.9801] [1.1530] 
Regression diagnostics         
Observations 637 618 618 636 636 636 636 636 
Pseudo R2 0.0217 0.0194 0.0194 0.0205 0.0239 0.0214 n.a. n.a. 
R2 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 0.0869 0.0849 
p-value joint significance of all variables 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
p-value joint significance of individual 0.0980 0.1990 0.2220 0.0889 0.0998 0.117 0.0453 0.0840 
p-value joint significance of party dummies 0.1130 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
p-value joint significance of state-controls 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0007 
Notes: Columns (1)-(6) display marginal effects for the maximum category (= +4), columns (7) and (8) display OLS coefficients, */**/*** denote significance at the 10%/5%/1% level; standard 
errors in brackets are clustered at the state-party level; a base category for the individual party-dummies is the free democratic party; b State characteristics are 2010 data for survey waves 1 and 2, 
which both took place in 2011, and 2011 data for survey wave 3, which took place in 2012.  
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Table 10: Regression results for fiscal equalization question (-4=too low; +4=too far reaching)  
  
 Ideological variations Legacy variation Interaction effects 
 (1) OProbit (2) OProbit (3) OProbit (4) OProbit (5) OProbit (6) OProbit (7) OLS (8) OLS 
Education         
Tertiary degree 0.0112 0.0076 0.0098 0.0118 0.0027 0.0172 0.1678 0.1722 
 [0.0150] [0.0146] [0.0149] [0.0149] [0.0159] [0.0149] [0.1379] [0.1382] 
Economics/Business degree -0.0097 -0.0082 -0.0078 -0.0097 -0.0124 -0.0167 -0.1525 -0.1624 
 [0.0191] [0.0195] [0.0200] [0.0181] [0.0190] [0.0195] [0.1661] [0.1667] 
Information         
Member of budget committee 0.0116 0.0147 0.0157 0.0115 0.0165 0.0129 0.1147 0.1110 
 [0.0196] [0.0198] [0.0199] [0.0190] [0.0192] [0.0188] [0.1580] [0.1611] 
Member of legal committee -0.0095 -0.0091 -0.0107 -0.0106 -0.0105 -0.0116 -0.1037 -0.0999 
 [0.0257] [0.0265] [0.0258] [0.0251] [0.0243] [0.0245] [0.2064] [0.2091] 
Number of years in parliament -0.0007 -0.0007 -0.0006 -0.0005 0.0008 0.0000 -0.0008 -0.0009 
 [0.0013] [0.0013] [0.0014] [0.0013] [0.0014] [0.0013] [0.0112] [0.0109] 
Power         
Member of state gov’t coalition -0.0383 -0.0525 -0.0576 -0.0471 -0.0501* -0.0431 -0.4586 -0.5158 
 [0.0320] [0.0326] [0.0379] [0.0331] [0.0286] [0.0334] [0.3006] [0.8845] 
Other individual characteristics         
Female -0.0100 -0.0053 -0.0106 -0.0193 -0.0120 -0.0161 -0.1291 -0.1456 
 [0.0238] [0.0247] [0.0242] [0.0252] [0.0245] [0.0253] [0.2255] [0.2287] 
Age in years 0.0001 -0.0000 -0.0001 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0009 -0.0010 
 [0.0009] [0.0008] [0.0009] [0.0008] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0075] [0.0073] 
Ideology         
Christian Democrats -0.0122        
 [0.0365]        
Social Democrats -0.0745**        
 [0.0326]        
Green Party -0.0676*        
 [0.0354]        
Left Party 0.0249        
 [0.0454]        
Other parties -0.0114        
 [0.0522]        
Right parties  0.0493       
  [0.0320]       
Pappi Indicator   0.0196      
   [0.0205]      
Preference for lower taxes and fees    0.0027** 0.0025** 0.0030*** 0.0255*** 0.0260*** 
    [0.0010] [0.0011] [0.0011] [0.0093] [0.0091] 
Continued on next page.         
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Table 10: Regression results for fiscal equalization question (-4=too low; +4=too far reaching) (continued) 
 
 
 Ideological variations Legacy variation Interaction effects 
 (1) OProbit (2) OProbit (3) OProbit (4) OProbit (5) OProbit (6) OProbit (7) OLS (8) OLS 
State characteristicsa: income and size         
GDP per capita 0.0087*** 0.0074** 0.0079** 0.0073** 0.0100*** 0.0018 0.0142 0.0128 
 [0.0031] [0.0030] [0.0033] [0.0031] [0.0031] [0.0024] [0.0196] [0.0299] 
Absolute deviation of state GDP per  -0.0078 -0.0064 -0.0065 -0.0056 -0.0161** -0.0040 -0.0322 -0.0324 
    capita from federal GDP per capita [0.0054] [0.0053] [0.0057] [0.0055] [0.0064] [0.0059] [0.0491] [0.0528] 
Population 0.0001 0.0003 0.0008 0.0007 -0.0090* -0.0002 0.0019 0.0022 
 [0.0046] [0.0047] [0.0047] [0.0044] [0.0048] [0.0051] [0.0447] [0.0448] 
State characteristicsa: legacies         
Total debt to GDP -0.0067*** -0.0069*** -0.0071*** -0.0066***     
 [0.0021] [0.0022] [0.0022] [0.0019]     
3 year average of deficit to GDP     -0.1100***    
     [0.0239]    
Consolidation needs as share of GDP      -0.0736*** -0.6240*** -0.6339*** 
      [0.0248] [0.2079] [0.2085] 
State characteristicsa: equalization         
Fiscal equalization transfers to GDP -0.0033 0.0011 0.0023 -0.0077 -0.0842*** -0.0432 -0.5798** -0.4000 
 [0.0304] [0.0322] [0.0330] [0.0297] [0.0168] [0.0286] [0.2316] [0.2449] 
Interaction effects         
Fiscal equalization transfers to GDP ×       0.2720  
     Member of state gov’t coalition       [0.2659]  
GDP per capita ×        0.0037 
     Member of state gov’t coalition        [0.0291] 
Constant         
Constant term (OLS estimation)       1.5094 1.5375 
       [0.9142] [0.9709] 
Regression diagnostics         
Observations 631 612 612 630 630 630 630 630 
Pseudo R2 0.0912 0.0832 0.0813 0.0890 0.0971 0.0834   
R2       0.2918 0.2887 
p-value joint significance of all variables 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
p-value joint significance of individual 0.953  0.782  0.867  0.869  0.783  0.870  0.758  0.8550 
p-value joint significance of party dummies 0.0572 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 
p-value joint significance of state-controls 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Notes:  Columns (1)-(6) display marginal effects for the maximum category (= +4), columns (7) and (8) display OLS coefficients, */**/*** denote significance at the 10%/5%/1% level; standard 
errors in brackets are clustered at the state-party level; a base category for the individual party-dummies is the free democratic party; b State characteristics are 2010 data for survey waves 1 and 2, 
which both took place in 2011, and 2011 data for survey wave 3, which took place in 2012.  
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5.4 Robustness tests 
Our first robustness test returns to the multicollinearity issue. Table 11 shows the correlation 
coefficients of GDP per capita with the measure of consolidation needs and fiscal equalization 
transfers. All variables are highly correlated which probably explain the missing significance 
of fiscal equalization transfers in the regression results of Tables 9-10. 
Table 11: Correlation coefficients of selected variables 
 GDP per capita 
Consolidation needs 
as share of GDP 
Fiscal equalization 
transfers to GDP 
GDP per capita 1   
Consolidation needs as share of GDP -0.3982 1  
Fiscal equalization transfers to GDP -0.4245 0.7766 1 
Notes: 637 observations included. 
To demonstrate this, we have re-estimated our model by excluding the GDP per capita or/and 
the measure of consolidation needs. The results are shown in Table 12. The coefficient of 
fiscal equalization transfers has the expected sign and is statistically highly significant if we 
exclude the GDP per capita or/and the consolidation needs. The result supports our hypothesis 
that state self-interest is important: Politicians from states with high fiscal equalization 
transfers are more opposed to cut back transfers as their counterparts in net-payer states.  
Given multicollinearity, we have also re-estimated the interaction effects by excluding 
consolidation needs or/and GDP per capita. The results do not change, however. There is no 
additional statistically significant impact of these interaction terms in the absence of those 
variables.14  
The results of further robustness tests are shown in the appendix (see Table A 3). We use 
specification 6 from the main results as the baseline specification. In a first step, we re-
estimate the model applying a weighted regression. As regression weights we use the inverse 
of responses per party and state to the party and state basic population. The main results are 
robust, i.e. there is a strong positive effect of individual ideology towards lower taxes and 
fees. State characteristics matter as well. This especially holds for consolidation needs for the 
period 2011 to 2020. In a second step, we replace all state characteristics but include state 
fixed effects in the regressions. The main result for the personal characteristics is not affected 
by this change. Referring to the fiscal equalization preferences, however, the alternative 
models show an additional statistically significant impact of individual power. Members of 
state government parties thus are more in favor of increased fiscal equalizations compared to 
members of opposition parties. 
                                                 
14 The results are not shown but are available upon request. 
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Table 12: Regression results: robustness test on multicollinearity 
 
 
6 State-specific median preferences and predicted reform majorities  
We now make use of our estimation models to identify the constraints which federal reforms 
are facing in state parliaments and the Bundesrat. For that purpose, we use the estimated 
models to predict the (voting) preferences of all politicians whether they participated in our 
survey or not. With the exception of the individual ideology proxy (preference for lower taxes 
 Tax autonomy preferences Fiscal equalization preferences 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Education       
Tertiary degree -0.0352 -0.0340 -0.0358 0.0168 0.0160 0.0159 
 [0.0254] [0.0252] [0.0255] [0.0150] [0.0154] [0.0153] 
Economics/Business degree 0.0268 0.0239 0.0292 -0.0150 -0.0080 -0.0078 
 [0.0293] [0.0291] [0.0292] [0.0191] [0.0180] [0.0176] 
Information       
Member of budget committee -0.0186 -0.0203 -0.0182 0.0134 0.0128 0.0129 
 [0.0264] [0.0260] [0.0261] [0.0191] [0.0191] [0.0193] 
Member of legal committee -0.0526 -0.0576* -0.0529 -0.0106 -0.0135 -0.0133 
 [0.0332] [0.0330] [0.0334] [0.0242] [0.0264] [0.0261] 
Number of years in parliament 0.0013 0.0017 0.0013 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 [0.0016] [0.0015] [0.0016] [0.0013] [0.0014] [0.0015] 
Power       
Member of state gov’t coalition -0.0024 0.0029 -0.0002 -0.0437 -0.0371 -0.0373 
 [0.0249] [0.0223] [0.0255] [0.0344] [0.0390] [0.0394] 
Other individual characteristics       
Female -0.0385 -0.0438* -0.0402 -0.0155 -0.0217 -0.0216 
 [0.0239] [0.0251] [0.0245] [0.0254] [0.0281] [0.0279] 
Age in years -0.0016 -0.0016 -0.0016 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 [0.0011] [0.0011] [0.0011] [0.0009] [0.0009] [0.0009] 
Ideology       
Preference for lower taxes and fees 0.0030*** 0.0029** 0.0030*** 0.0030*** 0.0031*** 0.0031*** 
 [0.0011] [0.0012] [0.0011] [0.0011] [0.0010] [0.0010] 
State characteristicsa: income and size       
GDP per capita  0.0074***   0.0003  
  [0.0018]   [0.0025]  
Absolute deviation of state GDP per  -0.0011 -0.0064 0.0015 -0.0018 0.0050 0.0054 
    capita from federal GDP per capita [0.0035] [0.0046] [0.0032] [0.0045] [0.0048] [0.0038] 
Population 0.0017 0.0001 0.0041 0.0010 0.0075 0.0077 
 [0.0037] [0.0045] [0.0039] [0.0048] [0.0062] [0.0061] 
State characteristicsa: legacies       
Consolidation needs as share of GDP -0.0259   -0.0711***   
 [0.0194]   [0.0247]   
State characteristicsa: equalization       
Fiscal equalization transfers to GDP -0.0133 -0.0159 -0.0323** -0.0497* -0.1022*** -0.1030***
 [0.0219] [0.0128] [0.0160] [0.0279] [0.0282] [0.0273] 
Regression diagnostics       
Observations 636 636 636 630 630 630 
Pseudo R2 0.0146 0.0194 0.0137 0.0829 0.0721 0.0721 
Notes: All specifications are estimated as ordered probit. This table displays marginal effects for the maximum category (= 
+4), */**/*** denote significance at the 10%/5%/1% level; standard errors in brackets are clustered at the state-party level; a
State characteristics are 2010 data for survey waves 1 and 2, which both took place in 2011, and 2011 data for survey wave 
3, which took place in 2012. bWe use the inverse of responses per party and state to the party and state basic population as 
regression weights. 
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and fees, this variable originates from the survey itself) all control variables are also available 
for politicians not participating in our survey.  
The first step identifies the preferences of each state parliament’s median position, which is 
defined by the middle position when ordering the predicted preferences across the -4/+4 
answer scale. The results in Figure 6 (upper part) show that median positions in Eastern 
German states, Lower Saxony and Rhineland-Palatinate are (mildly) opposed to tax 
autonomy. With respect to fiscal equalization the Eastern German states (excluding Saxony) 
as well as Bremen are in favor of, while the others are opposed to more fiscal equalization 
with the resistance being particularly strong in the net-contributor states of Bavaria, Baden-
Wuerttemberg, and Hesse. 
The second step makes use of these predictions to identify predicted majorities within states 
and the Bundesrat. We estimate the approval rate per state for both reform dimensions. The 
algorithm assigns an approving position to each politician for whom the predicted survey 
answer is above zero on the -4/+4-scale. The approval to both reform dimensions per state is 
presented in Figure 6 (lower part). There is a slight majority of 9 to 7 German states which 
would vote in favor of increasing tax rate autonomy and a larger majority of 10 to 6 in favor 
of less intense equalization. The Eastern German states would reject both tax autonomy (with 
the exception of Berlin) and a reduction of equalization payments (with the exception of 
Saxony). Western German states would be united (with the dissenter Bremen) to vote in favor 
of a less ambitious equalization system and have less agreement on tax autonomy. According 
to our model’s predictions, the within-state agreement against the current equalization 
intensity is large; approval rates for less equalization frequently reach 100%, that is, all 
politicians in the respective state parliament (at least slightly) think that the current system of 
fiscal equalization is too far reaching and would thus vote for a reduction. The marked 
exceptions are states in Eastern Germany and the poorer city states of Berlin and Bremen 
(with a 0% reform support in these two city states). 
As described in section 2, the states cast their votes in the Bundesrat as bloc votes. Voting 
weights are summarized in Table 13. Decisions in normal legislation pass with absolute 
majority (i.e. 35 out of 69 total votes), while a change of the constitution requires the consent 
of two-thirds of the Bundesrat votes (i.e. 46 votes). 
We now aggregate pro-reform state votes according to the bloc vote rule in the Bundesrat, i.e. 
all state votes are counted according to the state majority position. The resulting majorities are 
40:29 in favor of tax autonomy and 47:22 in favor of less intense equalization. Thus, the 
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states opposing tax autonomy have the power to successfully veto a constitutional change 
which would be required to open the way towards individual state tax rate setting. However, 
the veto power is fragile. The switch of Lower Saxony alone into the tax autonomy camp 
would be sufficient to gain a pro-reform constitution changing majority. A reform towards 
less intense equalization is more likely than for tax autonomy because we predict a larger 
majority and an absolute majority rather than a qualified majority would be sufficient to 
change the fiscal equalization scheme.15 
 
Table 13: Distribution of votes in the Federal Council of Germany 
State Votes State Votes
Baden-Wuerttemberg 6 Saxony 4
Bavaria 6 Thuringia 4
North Rhine-Westphalia 6 Saxony-Anhalt 4
Lower Saxony 6 Berlin 4
Hesse 5 Bremen 3
Schleswig-Holstein 4 Hamburg 3
Rhineland-Palatinate 4 Mecklenburg-West Pomerania 3
Brandenburg 4 Saarland 3
Source: Basic Law (Grundgesetz), Article 51; www.bundesrat.de 
 
Of course, our calculations must be regarded with caution. In real future votes on reforms of 
Germany’s fiscal federal system the individual politician’s preference is not the only 
determinant. Actual votes will also be influenced by country-wide party strategies and party 
discipline. A further complication is that the composition of state parliaments will change in 
the future and voters might strategically select candidates to influence the upcoming fiscal 
federalism reform decisions. Accordingly, our predictions cannot be seen as an exact forecast 
of a future vote. However, they are indicative for the underlying voting tendencies and 
provide insights into the room for possible political compromises.  
                                                 
15 The principle of fiscal equalization is enshrined in the German constitution. The formulas and the intensity of 
equalization are defined in simple laws. 
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Figure 6: Median parliament member preferences and predicted voting behaviour per 
state 
Preference of the median parliament member 
Tax autonomy 
(-4=not in favour; +4=in favour) 
Fiscal equalization 
(-4=too low; +4=too far reaching) 
 
Description: Median of preferences per state is ∈ of the interval: 
[-2,-1] [-1,0] [0,1] [1,2] [2,3] 
 
 
Voting behaviour of states on reform options 
Tax autonomy 
(implementation of tax surcharges) 
Fiscal equalization 
(reduction of fiscal equalization transfers) 
 
Description: Approval to reform is ∈ of the interval: 
0 – 25% 25%- 50% 50% - 75% 75% - 100% 
 
 
State number 
 
1 Baden-Wuerttemberg 5 Hesse 9 Bremen 13 Berlin 
2 Bavaria 6 Thuringia 10 Lower Saxony 14 Hamburg 
3 Saarland 7 Saxony 11 Saxony-Anhalt 15 Schleswig-Holstein 
4 Rhineland-Palatinate 8 North Rhine-Westphalia 12 Brandenburg 16 Mecklenburg-West Pomerania 
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7 Conclusion 
 
The public finance literature has contributed a lot to our understanding of the incentive and 
welfare effects of federal institutions. By contrast, insights into the determinants of reform 
preferences and reform resistance of political decision makers are rare. This study contributes 
to this white spot in the context of the current federal reform debate in Germany. 
One clear result of our analysis is that there is the expected ideological link but that state 
interests are equally important to understand federal reform preferences. The ideological link 
exists in the sense that those sub-national politicians who prefer lower taxes and a lower size 
of government are also more inclined to accept a more competitive type of federalism for 
Germany. The impact of state interests is not as differentiated as theoretical tax competition 
models would suggest. The clear pattern is that richer states are more open for tax competition 
and less intense equalization than poorer states. MSPs from states which lag behind the 
country’s economic development do not seem to perceive the chances of tax competition as 
theoretical models would predict even for them. This can be taken as a challenging insight for 
public finance: Insofar there is a theoretical consensus that tax competition may also offer 
opportunities for poorer states (without significant budgetary legacies) this message has not 
yet reached the political discourse.  
What is consistent with theoretical reasoning is the fact that legacies play a prominent role for 
the understandinf of reform resistance: Large legacy debt (open or implicit) lowers the 
support for tax autonomy. This result points to the potential of a political bargain. Given that 
the resistance towards tax autonomy in some pivotal states is only weak, some targeted 
collective help with respect to the legacy debt problem could open the way for compromise 
and a move towards tax autonomy in the upcoming reform decisions on German federalism. 
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Appendix 
Table A 1: Variable description 
 
  
Education      
Tertiary degree Dummy Degree from university or polytechnic 
Economics/Business degree Dummy Tertiary education in business or economics 
      
Information      
Member of budget committee Dummy Deals with state government budget  
Member of legal committee Dummy Deals with state’s legal issues 
Number of years in parliament Discrete Calculated as 2011/2012 minus year of parliament 
entry (interruptions taken into account) 
   
Power   
Member of government coalition at state level Dummy Member of one of the ruling parties 
      
Other individual characteristics      
Female Dummy Member of parliament is female 
Age in years Discrete Calculated as 2011/2012 minus year of birth 
   
Party affiliation      
Free Democrats Dummy Member of Free Democratic Party (base category) 
Christian Democrats Dummy Member of Christian Democratic or Christian 
Social Party  
Social Democrats Dummy Member of Social Democratic Party 
Green Party Dummy Member of Green Party 
Left Party Dummy Member of Left Party 
   
Other parties Dummy Member of other party 
Right parties Dummy Member of right wing party (Christian Democrats, 
Free Democrats; No value for the “other parties”)  
Pappi Indicator Continuous Share of „economic policy“ in state party programs 
1990-2010 (standardized, mean 0 and variance 1 ), 
source: Pappi and Seher (2013) 
Preference for lower taxes and fees Continuous Calculated as the percentage of a hypothesized 
additional state budget that is allocated to lowering 
taxes and fees (between 0 and 100%) 
   
State characteristics: income and size      
GDP per capita Continuous Gross domestic product per capita, in thousand 
Euros, 
source: German Statistical Office 
Absolute deviation of state GDP per capita 
    from federal GDP per capita 
Continuous Absolute deviation of state GDP per capita from 
federal GDP per capita   
source: German Statistical Office 
Population Continuous Population in millions 
source: German Statistical Office 
   
State characteristics: legacies   
Total debt to GDP Continuous Total debt divided by gross domestic product, in %, 
source: German Statistical Office 
3 year average of deficit to GDP Continuous 3 year average of deficit to GDP 
source: German Statistical Office 
Consolidation needs as share of GDP Continuous Consolidation needs for the period 2011 – 2020 as a 
share of calculatory nominal GDP  
  source: Sachverständigenrat (2011) 
State characteristics: equalization   
Fiscal equalization transfers Continuous Total net inter-state fiscal equalization transfer 
payments divided by GDP, in %,  
sources: Federal Ministry of Finance, German 
Statistical Office 
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Table A 2: Summary statistics for variables 
 
  
 Observations Mean Standard deviation Min Max 
Dependent variables (answer to survey question)      
Tax autonomy question 636 0.113 3.041 -4 4 
Fiscal equalization question 631 0.765 2.135 -4 4 
      
Education      
Tertiary degree 636 0.744 0.437 0 1 
Economics/Business degree 636 0.176 0.381 0 1 
      
Information      
Member of budget committee 636 0.206 0.404 0 1 
Member of legal committee 636 0.142 0.349 0 1 
Number of years in parliament 636 8.308 6.939 0 38 
      
Power      
Member of government coalition at state level 636 0.538 0.499 0 1 
      
Other individual characteristics      
Female 636 0.242 0.429 0 1 
Age in years 636 51.481 10.281 23 73 
      
Ideology      
Free Democrats 636 0.064 0.246 0 1 
Christian Democrats 636 0.443 0.497 0 1 
Social Democrats 636 0.270 0.445 0 1 
Green Party 636 0.118 0.323 0 1 
Left Party 636 0.074 0.262 0 1 
Other parties 636 0.030 0.170 0 1 
Right parties 617 0.524 0.500 0 1 
Pappi indicator 618 0.240 0.833 -1.83 1.28 
Preference for lower taxes and fees 636 3.044 9.882 0 100 
      
State characteristics: income and size      
GDP per capita 636 30.988 7.135 21.402 49.434 
Absolute deviation of state GDP per capita from  
   federal GDP per capita 
636 5.680 4.279 0.104 18.901 
Population 636 6.769 5.003 0.661 17.845 
      
State characteristics: legacies      
Total debt to GDP 636 27.496 15.405 6.920 73.628 
3 year average of deficit to GDP 636 0.898 0.863 -0.397 3.604 
Consolidation needs as share of GDP 636 1.240 1.135 -0.600 3.500 
      
State characteristics: equalization      
Fiscal equalization transfers received to GDP 636 0.237 0.908 -0.794 3.001 
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Table A 3: Regression results: robustness test with alternative specifications 
 
 
  
 Tax autonomy preferences Fiscal equalization preferences 
 (1) OProbit (2) OProbit (3) OProbit (4) OProbit 
Education     
Tertiary degree -0.0384 -0.0402 0.0203 -0.0036 
 [0.0277] [0.0254] [0.0184] [0.0156] 
Economics/Business degree 0.0179 0.0177 0.0102 -0.0042 
 [0.0271] [0.0293] [0.0222] [0.0183] 
Information     
Member of budget committee -0.0441 -0.0156 0.0089 0.0129 
 [0.0290] [0.0266] [0.0179] [0.0179] 
Member of legal committee -0.0464 -0.0567* 0.0093 -0.0108 
 [0.0353] [0.0320] [0.0241] [0.0245] 
Number of years in parliament 0.0024 0.0027* 0.0003 0.0003 
 [0.0016] [0.0015] [0.0015] [0.0012] 
Power     
Member of state gov’t coalition -0.0169 -0.0042 -0.0499* -0.0556*** 
 [0.0230] [0.0165] [0.0273] [0.0213] 
Other individual characteristics     
Female -0.0641** -0.0394 -0.0061 -0.0195 
 [0.0308] [0.0243] [0.0254] [0.0234] 
Age in years -0.0020 -0.0016 0.0002 0.0000 
 [0.0013] [0.0010] [0.0010] [0.0009] 
Ideology     
Preference for lower taxes and fees 0.0022* 0.0026** 0.0028** 0.0026** 
 [0.0011] [0.0012] [0.0011] [0.0010] 
State characteristicsa: income and size     
GDP per capita 0.0110***  0.0001  
 [0.0020]  [0.0020]  
Absolute deviation of state GDP per  -0.0161***  -0.0031  
    capita from federal GDP per capita [0.0049]  [0.0045]  
Population -0.0099**  0.0012  
 [0.0046]  [0.0039]  
State characteristicsa: legacies     
Consolidation needs as share of GDP -0.0555***  -0.0650***  
 [0.0176]  [0.0200]  
State characteristicsa: equalization     
Fiscal equalization transfers to GDP 0.0459**  -0.0345  
 [0.0228]  [0.0243]  
Regression diagnostics     
Weighted regressionb    
State fixed effects instead of state variables    
Observations 636 636 630 630 
Pseudo R2 0.0255 0.0279 0.0861 0.110 
Notes: This table displays marginal effects for the maximum category (= +4), */**/*** denote significance at the 
10%/5%/1% level; standard errors in brackets are clustered at the state-party level; a State characteristics are 2010 data for 
survey waves 1 and 2, which both took place in 2011, and 2011 data for survey wave 3, which took place in 2012. bWe use 
the inverse of responses per party and state to the party and state basic population as regression weights. 
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